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ABSTRACT 
In today’s world, innovations in software have provided organizations a platform to 
establish a collaborative environment that leverages new technologies. The Marine Corps 
is not immune from this innovation and must look at current innovations that can link 
current systems to decision makers. As today’s technology has advanced, the Marine 
Corps’ duty is to influence innovation to provide a collaborate environment. This 
collaborative environment, specifically command and control (C2) systems, must 
facilitate information retrieval at all levels while maintaining the authoritative integrity. 
This thesis provides information about Planning Application Extension (PAE), a 
collaborative software currently employed within Marine Air Ground Task Force 
(MAGTF). Furthermore, this thesis examines how software applications can efficiently 
improve knowledge sharing during an Operational Planning Team (OPT) session. Having 
this context provides a platform for increased operational awareness of how real time 
information empowers the commander, staffs, and planners. Finding indicates that the 
PAE, a layer seven software extension, can be highly effective if properly leveraged by 
staffs and planners. Conversely, PAE is not well known and has a complex graphical user 
interface (GUI). Both attributes greatly affected the adoption rate of this platform. Thesis 
recommendations are that PAE become software of record to provide continuity in the 
execution of Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) regardless of geographic location. 
MAGTF staff training program (MSTP) should incorporate PAE in future MAGTF 
training, both integrated into the current curriculum and through distance learning. 
Furthermore, an updated PAE GUI will provide an intuitive experience and influence the 
perceived ease of use (PEOU) for the user.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In today’s world, innovations in software have provided organizations a platform to 
establish a collaborative environment that leverages new technologies for operational 
planning. The Marine Corps should take advantage of this emerging environment and 
look at existing technological capabilities that can leverage current systems to support 
decision makers. As today’s technology has advanced, the Marine Corps should leverage 
technical innovation that will provide a more productive collaborate environment. This 
collaborative environment, specifically command and control (C2) systems, must 
facilitate information retrieval at all levels while maintaining an authoritative integrity. 
This thesis provides a review of capabilities of collaborative software currently 
employed within Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). Furthermore, this thesis 
examines how software applications can efficiently improve knowledge sharing during an 
Operational Planning Team (OPT) session. Having this context provides a platform for 
increased operational awareness of how real time information empowers the commander, 
staffs, and planners. 
The thesis findings indicated that the Planning Application Extension (PAE), a 
layer seven software extension, could be highly effective if properly leveraged by staffs 
and planners. PAE provides a powerful platform for wargaming by leveraging artificial 
intelligence (AI). The AI within PAE is a complex computation of algorithms that enable 
multiple courses of action (COAs) to be analyzed and simulated with regards to enemy 
against friendly relative combat power (RCP). Furthermore, PAE empowers commanders 
to simulate each COA and provide immediate feedback to subordinates while enabling a 
highly responsive staff action, which allows staff and planners to make real time changes 
to the plan regardless of geographic location. 
Finally, PAE has shown several potential benefits as a result of a knowledge value 
added (KVA) simulation. By using Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) as a sample 
base for the KVA simulation, PAE enabled a 50% reduction in staffing of a standard 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) planning teams, which allowed a cost reduction of 
 xx 
39% per planning process session. Additionally, PAE enabled the standard six hours 
R2P2 process to be reduced to four hours and 44 minutes, a savings of one hour a 16 
minutes. However, PAE is not well known and has a complex Graphical User Interface 
(GUI). Both attributes greatly affected the adoption rate of this platform.  
Thesis recommendations are that PAE is a software of record and that MAFTF 
Staff Training Program (MSTP) conduct studies focused on time savings analysis, the 
benefits of distance learning for C2 systems, and on bandwidth analysis of PAE during 
OPT planning sessions. Furthermore, MSTP should incorporate PAE in future MAGTF 
training for both residential and distance learning programs. Additionally, an updated 
PAE GUI will provide an intuitive experience and influence the perceived ease of use 
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A. PROBLEM OVERVIEW 
In today’s world, innovations in software have provided organizations a platform 
to establish a collaborative environment that leverages new technologies. The Marine 
Corps should look at existing collaborative technologies that can link current systems to 
decision makers. The problem is the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), which 
provides the commanders, and their staffs, a means to organize their planning activities 
and transmit the plan to subordinates’ commanders, is not standardized. This situation is 
a problem because current software within the Marine Corps is not being leveraged to 
mitigate the inconsistent information that inhibits or disrupts the commanders’ decision-
making process. A potential solution is the use of Planning Application Extension (PAE). 
Furthermore, by leveraging PAE, the Marine Corps should be able to reduce time and 
cost during an operational planning session. A second problem is PAE is not being 
widely used, which creates an adoption rate problem.  
The purpose of this thesis is to gain insights into the potential benefits and 
challenges the Marine Corps has in adopting PAE and using it during Operational 
Planning Team (OPT) sessions. This thesis specifically uses the case of the Rapid 
Response Planning Process (R2P2) to frame an understanding of how adopting PAE will 
contribute to R2P2 effectiveness. This study tests two approaches (i.e., manual or 
automated) to R2P2, and controls for planning sessions and time. The manual process of 
R2P2 serves as a baseline “as-is” of the planning process. It provides measures by which 
the incorporation of information technology (IT) systems and software can be evaluated. 
In this research, the knowledge value added (KVA) methodology is used to compare the 
“as-is” process to the “to-be” processes in which notional IT systems and software are 
incorporated. The results of these comparisons are provided to the Marine Corps as 
recommendations regarding the development of IT systems to aid the planning process. 
This information is vital because as today’s collaborative technology has 
advanced, the Marine Corps has an opportunity to leverage existing innovation like PAE 
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that will provide a more robust collaborate environment. This collaborative environment, 
specifically command and control (C2) systems, must facilitate information retrieval at 
all levels while maintaining an authoritative integrity. The Department of Defense 
(DOD), and specifically the Marine Corps, has seen a significant increase in technology 
that links mission planning to decision makers. As the technology and its influence on 
mission planning continue to expand, planners must define what information will be the 
most useful in planning future operations. Many of the fundamental principles of 
collaboration are embedded in Marine Corps doctrine, publications, and pamphlets that 
comprise a structured manual process for decision making.  
Currently, a variety of recent studies on collaborative planning by McKearney 
(2013), Rogers (2011), and McKenna (2006) illustrate the use of collaborative tools in 
military planning that influence decision making. These studies provide a foundation in a 
collaborative environment for an OPT through automation and help identifying the 
information requirements a commander needs in making a decisive decision during 
combat operations. Furthermore, through the use of the Davis’s (1989) Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) a framework of how information influences users’ perceptions 
and perceived ease of use (PEOU) can potentially impact the adoption rate of PAE. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The current thesis research provides awareness of collaborative tools currently 
employed within Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). A MAGTF is an air-ground 
force task organized structure to meet specific mission, which falls under a single 
commander (MCDP 1-0, 2001). Additionally, this thesis examines how PAE can 
efficiently improve knowledge sharing during an OPT session, as well as illustrate the 
adoption rate challenges the Marine Corps may have towards PAE. PAE is a layer seven 
software components designed to assist planners in all aspects of planning and used in the 
next generation C2 system, the joint tactical common operating picture workstation 
(JTCW). PAE frees staffs and planners from most of the mundane tasks like course of 
action (COA) development and order development, which is associated with operational 
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planning. PAE allows staffs to focus on the higher-level concepts: missions, plans, tasks, 
activities, and resources. 
This thesis was designed to collect data to address the following research 
questions. 
 Does automation exist that will enhance collaboration during MCPP? 
 How will PAE software design enhance capabilities within the OPT?  
 How does PAE enhance collaboration? 
 How much value does PAE add to R2P2? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Initial research is primarily secondary research focused on gathering information 
from books, periodicals, knowledge bases, and other library information services 
describing collaborative technology. Additionally, research is conducted through a 
review of the decision-making process and the decision cycle used within the Marine 
Corps. Secondary research also includes an analysis of collaborative tools currently used 
within the MAGTF to assess the contribution they have made and address the challenges 
in their adoption. 
Finally, this thesis models R2P2 as conducted during a simulation and establishes 
the baseline analysis of the planning process using the KVA methodology. In conducting 
the KVA analysis, the Return on Knowledge (ROK) for each of the planning processes as 
a whole is determined. As the ROK baseline is established, a hypothetical scenario with 
notional software technologies—specifically PAE—is evaluated to determine the impact 
of the IT systems within R2P2.  
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter provided the problem 
statement overview, objective, and methodology employed to conduct the research on 
MCPP automation. Chapter II presents an introduction to TAM while providing 
background and elements that shape a commander’s decision cycle and behavioral 
intension. Chapter III continues to address technology acceptance while focusing on 
current C2 within an MAGTF. Chapter IV provides a look at disruptive technologies 
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while outlining the capabilities of PAE, which has been developed to link MCPP and 
MAGTF C2 systems. Chapter V reviews the findings from the case study and provides 
conclusions and recommendations for future collaborative work. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying 
out effective ways of bringing it about. 
—MCDP 5, Planning 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Through the TAM, this chapter illustrates a user’s behavioral intention (BI) 
towards the use PAE. As seen in Figure 1, the user’s BI towards the use of the system is 
influenced by the perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (EOU) of that 
system (Davis, 1998). This study uses TAM as a framework to analyze Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, MCDP 5, and MCDP 1-0. These documents provide an 
introduction into methodologies of fighting a war and establish a basis for the ways 
Marines interprets how to fight a war. As seen in MCDP 1, Marines are introduced to 
three levels of warfighting: strategic, operational, and tactical, which provides 
background in understanding requirements for new software application while 
establishing a foundation for BI in using that new software application. As Davis (1998) 
noted, if users can be influenced by a system they are using that is of high quality, their 
actual system use will increase. 
 
Figure 1.  Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (from Davis, 1998) 
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This finding is significant because Naveh (1997) noted the operational level of 
war concept was not seen in military doctrine until the 1970s. Naveh goes on to state that 
military forces have steadily sought improvements to operational interpretations, 
methodology, and resources that link the strategic and tactical phases of armed conflict. 
Over time, this understanding has forced definitions of operational level of war to mature 
(Naveh, 1997). Since TAM suggests that users’ BI be facilitated by their belief in the PU 
and PEOU of the system, changing their perceptions about that system would influence 
their use of that system that, in turn, would increase the adoption of the system. This 
perception is a substantial paradigm, which requires a closer look at how the Marine 
Corps should leverage PAE to continue the growth in operational interpretations, 
methodology, and resources.  
As Marines conclude 10 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, the links 
between all three levels of war have been solidified and accepted by them. Both 
operational art and design provide a starting point that begins to build the operational 
structure (JP 3-0, 2010). As illustrated in MCWP 3-40.1 (2010) the planning, decision, 
execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycle is the process commanders and their staff use 
to plan operations, make accurate and timely decisions, direct the effective execution of 
operations, and assess the results of those operations. Through the use of PAE, linking 
this mental picture (operational structure), leaders will have an increased awareness that 
encompasses all activities occurring within the operational level of war and translating 
strategic guidance into cohesive tactical actions.  
B. DESIGN THEORY 
A seen in Figure 2, a distinct difference exists between design and planning. The 
design and planning continuum model allow planners to understand the nuances between 
design and planning while illustrating how both activities seek to formulate ways to bring 
desired outcomes. Requirements are easily developed out of the design and planning 
continuum model and provide a blueprint on the perception that PAE could have on the 
BI of a user. As noted in MCDP 5, planning uses two basic functions, envisioning desired 
outcome, and arranging a structure of potential action in time and space that allows a 
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desired endstate. As noted in MCDP 1-0, planning can be placed in three levels: 
conceptual, functional, and detailed. These three levels of planning provide a focus on 
generating a plan while allowing planners to focus on the design of learning about the 
nature of the problem. As seen in PAE, a planning checklist tool allows the user to 
display the different planning processes like MCPP, MEU/ARG Planning Process 
(MEU/ARG PP), Army Planning Process (the MDMP) and the ESG Planning Process 
(ESGPP) (PAE Manual, 2013). These checklists provide a starting point for functionality 
of PAE and the first step toward the BI of the user when designing an operations plan.  
 
Figure 2.  Design and Planning Continuum 
Maier and Rechtin (2002) define design as embodying architecting that deals 
mostly with unmeasurable using non-quantitative tools and guidelines based on practical 
lessons learned. Design analyzes the nature of the problem and provides a framework for 
solving that problem. By using Maier and Rechtin’ (2002) understanding of design, an 
outline is established for software to enhance operational planning resulting in detailed 
military orders and tactical action. An example is PAEs Operational Plan (OPLAN) 
function, which provides the user with specific information regarding mission. OPLAN 
provides subordinates with the operational and tactical freedom to accomplish the 
mission.  
PAE can assist commanders in developing a conceptual framework within an 
organization to understand, visualize, and illustrate the operational environment. Since 
the environment is dynamic, problems also evolve. An example is commanders 
conceptualize their operation; their periodic guidance is in the form of visualization, 
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description, and direction, which guides the staffs throughout the planning. Through an 
understanding of design, said commanders have the means to learn and critically think 
while actively engaging decision making at all levels. Design as defined by Maier and 
Rechtin (2002) provides a starting point for Marine Corps planning theory. 
C. MARINE CORPS PLANNING THEORY  
Marine Corps planning theory is a fundamental understanding of warfighting 
concepts and planning references MCDP 1, MCDP 5, and MCDP 1–0 illustrate a 
building block approach to explain the Marine Corps’ requirements in both manual and 
automated processes. MCDP 1 provides guidance on warfighting concepts pertinent to 
planning. MCDP 5 analyzes the Marine Corps planning theory. Finally, this thesis 
clarifies how Marine Corps planning theory influenced and shaped operational planning 
concepts in MCDP 1–0. Furthermore, by establishing a lens using TAM, an 
understanding would develop of how PAE can affect perceived useful and ease of 
technology. 
1. MCDP 1 Warfighting  
MCDP 1 establishes the Marine Corps philosophy on war, and within this 
philosophy, three factors influence Marine Corps planning theory (MCDP 1, 1997):  the 
complexity of war, the science/art of war, and the centrality of the commander. The 
complexities help elevate the importance of using automation. MCDP 1 describes war as 
a “complex phenomenon” (p.12, para. 2) and continues to explain, “as a result, war is not 
governed by the actions or decisions of a single person in any one place but emerges from 
the collective behavior of all the different parts in the system interacting locally in 
response to local conditions and incomplete information” (MCDP 1, 1997, p. 12. para. 3). 
MCDP 1 goes on to illustrate, “conduct of war is fundamentally a dynamic process of 
human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and creativity of art, but 
driven ultimately by the power of human will” (MCDP 1, 1997, p.19, para. 1).  
In response to this concept, planning theory must cope with the art and science 
elements associated with conducting and planning warfare. A balance between artistic 
elements, such as creative solutions resulting from an awareness of the situation, and the 
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science elements, such as planning to support limited transportation assets, is a delicate 
balance. Planning processes and theory must provide mechanisms for operational 
architecting (artistic elements), operational planning (scientific elements), and their 
interaction. As seen when PAE allows users to share plans with other users running the 
planning, application in a military operation. Finally, MCDP 1 describes the centrality of 
the commander to all warfighting activities (MCDP 1, 1997).  
The commander is central to the organization structure, planning, and action. 
Therefore, a USMC planning theory must describe this commander’s lead role in all 
planning activities. In summary, for Marine Corps planning theory to be consistent with 
Marine Corps warfighting philosophy, Marine Corps planning theory must cope with war 
as a complex system as seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Marine Corps planning theory 
must also apply both art and science to the planning and execution of warfare through the 
use of existing software like PAE that will enable the commander to become the central 
participant in planning. This concept falls in line with one element of TAM, that a 
perception of technology is perceived useful, and starts to fill in the values of increasing 
productivity and making jobs easier (Segars & Grover, 1993).  
2. MCDP 5 Planning  
MCDP 5 explains that the “publication describes the theory and philosophy of 
military planning as practiced by the U.S. Marine Corps” (MCDP 5, 1997, page 2, para. 
1). MCDP 5 consists of three chapters. Chapter I defines planning and plans, as well as a 
general characteristic of the process. Chapter III presents characteristics of good plans 
and the relationship between the commander and planners. This thesis focuses on Chapter 
II, as it presents the theory behind the Marine Corps planning process.  
The analysis of MCDP 5 provides elements of the Marine Corps planning 
theories, which are the classical decision-making process, analysis, and synthesis, the 
centrality of the commander and a tactical focus (MCDP 5, 1997). A seen in Figure 3, the 
classical decision-making process set the foundation for the Marine Corps’ planning 
theory and develops a framework for automation.  
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Figure 3.  Presents the Classical Decision Making Process 
(from MCDP 5, 1997) 
This process is used to manage both analysis and synthesis activities. MCDP 5 
defines analysis as “the systematic process of studying the subject by successively 
is decomposing the subject into parts and dealing with each of the parts in turn” (p. 34, 
para. 1) and synthesis as the “creative process of integrating elements into a cohesive 
whole.” (p. 34, para. 2) Therefore, MCDP 5 describes the science of war as analysis and 
the art of war as synthesis. To illustrate, these current C2 systems provide a link that 
helps staffs to analyze information that then is synthesized into segments of information 
that help the commander make a decision. MCDP 5 relates these concepts to actual 
activities mapped as the hierarchy of planning, consisting of the conceptual, functional, 
and detailed levels. Conceptual planning is the highest level of planning primarily 
requiring synthesis activities while detailed planning is at the bottom of the hierarchy, 
primarily requiring analysis activities. Functional planning is the middle level requiring 
elements of art and science. According to Marine Corps planning theory, the higher 
levels of the planning hierarchy require more synthesis, whereas lower levels need more 
analysis (MCDP 5, 1997) as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Presents the Marine Corps Planning Hierarchy 
(from MCDP 5, 1997) 
Central to the planning hierarchy and the application of art and science are the 
roles of a commander. Marine Corps planning theory centers on the commander who is 
primarily responsible for conceptual planning while functional and detailed planning 
activities are delegated to the staffs (MCDP 5, 1997). An example is receiving an order 
from higher headquarters (HHQ). The commanders will provide an intent or expectation 
(art of war) of how to achieve HHQ mission while the staffs will focus on how to execute 
(science of war), which is the commander’s intent. PAE takes this one step further and 
provides planners with an auto wargaming function that provides them with a rough COA 
to ascertain if the COA is viable. Auto wargaming is a great example of how PAE can 
influence the users’ PEOU. 
3. MCDP 1–0 Marine Corps Operations 
MCDP 1–0 (2001) “represents how warfighting philosophy is classified in 
operational terms” and “is the transition-the bridge-between the Marine Corps’ 
warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare to the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
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(TTP) used by Marines” (MCDP 1–0, 2001, page 2, para. 2). For the Marine Corps, 
MCDP 1–0 is part theory and part operational. It is important to analyze this thesis as it 
relates to the planning theory presented in MCDP 1 and 5 and the planning process 
presented in MCWP 5–1. Specifically, focusing on how existing technology can enhance 
Marine Corps operations, such as PAEs, which is based on Marine Corps doctrine to 
provide consistency in information (Savinovich, 2013).  
MCDP 1–0 (2001) translates planning theory into more operational specifics by 
categorizing the central role of the commander and summarizing the planning hierarchy. 
According to Naveh (1997), operational level planning bridges the concept of strategy 
and the mechanical act of tactics. MCDP 1–0 follows suit with MCDP 5 and delegates 
most of the conceptual planning and the artistic elements of war to the commanders. It is 
organized in what MCDP 1–0 (2001) describes as the operational design. MCDP 1–0 
defines operational design as “the commander’s tool for translating the operational 
requirements of his superiors into the tactical guidance needed by his subordinate 
commanders and staff” (p. 6-3, para. 3). The commanders use their operational design to 
visualize, describe, and direct those actions necessary while building the behavior needed 
to achieve the mission that is in line with TAMs’ value of working more quickly.  
The operational design includes “the purpose of the operation, what the 
commander wants to achieve, the desired effects on the enemy, and how he envisions 
achieving a decision” (MCDP 1–0, 2001, p. 6-3, para. 3). In essence, MCDP 1–0 requires 
the commander to apply the art of war to understand the environment, situation, and 
conceptual solution alone without staff assistance. MCDP 1–0 describes the commanders 
as lone conceptual planners with the details left for the staffs. In practice, commanders do 
not perform all conceptual planning alone, and most likely, the commanders’ staffs are 
involved from the beginning. However, if the Marine Corps followed its doctrine closely, 
the commander would essentially frame the environment, situation, and conceptual 
solution almost entirely alone. By leveraging PAE ability to import/export through 
multiple systems, an increase in the commanders’ operational reach would be achieved 
while again building on technology acceptance as defined by Bhattacherjee (2001) that 
notes that technology is better understood with continued use. 
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4. Summary 
Marine Corps planning theory focuses on the classical decision model, the role of 
the commander, and execution of the art and science of warfare during planning. Marine 
Corps planning theory also builds on behavioral intention by allowing commanders 
freedom within a planning framework to mature their attitude toward adoption of 
technology. Through the use of PAE, the commanders allow their staffs more time to 
focus on the art of warfighting, which provides a preconception of usefulness as defined 
by Davis (1989), the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system 
would enhance his or her job performance. Analyzing the use of PAE in gathering 
information using TAM provides a stepping stone towards technology acceptance. 
Moreover, the remainder of this chapter refers to the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication (MCWP) 5-1, which will lay the groundwork for tenets that will frame the 
requirements for PAE while illustrating elements of MCPP that link theory and 
execution. 
D. TENETS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS  
MCWP 5-1 identifies three tenets of the MCPP: top-down planning, a single 
battle, and integrated planning. These tenets are derived from the doctrine of maneuver 
warfare. Maneuver warfare is defined as a warfighting philosophy that focused on 
breaking the enemy’s unity through a diverse act of rapid, fixated, and unpredicted 
activities, which create a tempestuous and swift weakening enemy will to fight (MCDP 
1–0, 2001). Tenets guide the commanders’ use of their staffs to plan and execute military 
operations (MCWP 5-1, 2010). Top-down planning and the single-battle concept ensure 
unity of command, that is to say, unity of effort while, the commanders use the OPT to 
ensure integration of the warfighting functions across the staffs and subordinate and 
supporting units. 
1. Top-Down Planning 
Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command, and commanders must 
actively participate in directing the planning process (MCWP 5-1, 2010). The 
commanders’ intent and guidance are essential to planning and establishes the first step in 
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gaining knowledge and understanding supporting their decision-making process. Their 
plan, communicated in oral, graphic, or written format, translates their guidance into a 
plan of action for their subordinate commanders. As seen, PAE interface capabilities 
allow users to share plans with other users running the planning application (PAE 
Manual, 2014). Top-down planning is a building block for a single-battle concept. 
2. Single-Battle Concept 
Single battle is a unifying perspective that recognizes the interrelationship among 
dispersed actions. For example, the success of deep fires facilitates rapid ground 
maneuver. Commanders’ intent can only set conditions for a single battle concept that 
both guides and empowers subordinates to act towards unforeseen conditions within the 
framework of a larger design. Commanders realize a single battle in execution through 
the willing cooperation of subordinates to understand their role and coordinate laterally 
while exercising top sight (a grasp of the larger picture). The battlespace is conceptually 
divided into deep, close, and rear areas, which assist in decentralized execution and 
planning. Commanders’ intent ensures unity of effort by fighting a single battle (MCWP 
5-1, 2010). The planning application allows commander to define tasks and see the effect 
of those tasks over a period of time. This animation within PAE provides validation to the 
single battle concept and confirms the efforts of all the elements of force to accomplish 
its assigned mission (PAE Manual, 2014). An example is once the single-battle concept is 
accomplished, the staffs will integrate the commanders’ intent, and by leveraging 
technology, can link the needed resources to enhance the overall operational plan that 
will increase the adoption rate of PAE. 
3. Integrated Planning 
Integrated planning provides the commanders and their staffs a disciplined 
approach to planning that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough (MCWP 5-1, 2010). 
Through the OPT, it incorporates expertise from all the warfighting functions—command 
and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection to provide unity. 
Unity of effort is gained through integrated planning, which allows planners to consider 
all relevant factors and develop a link to subordinate actions. By providing integrated 
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planning, PAE provides a platform that can influence the connection of resources and 
ideas to allow staffs more time to use their military experience when validating the 
overall operational plan. As seen using PAEs’ auto wargaming allows commanders to 
determine an asset required by two or more units and then task organize by time (PAE 
Manual, 2014). 
E. WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS 
Marine Corps warfighting functions encompass all military activities in the 
battlespace that allows planners to integrate the warfighting functions when designing 
how to achieve the mission. Integrating the warfighting functions ensures an integrated 
plan and helps achieve unity of effort and focus. As stated in MCDP 1-2 (2012), 
campaigning, and Marine forces obtain “maximum impact by harmonizing the 
warfighting functions to achieve the desired objective within the shortest time possible 
and with minimum casualties.” (p. 76, para. 1) The six warfighting functions are 
command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. They 
apply equally across the range of military operations and are the building blocks for all 
types of operations, including prolonged, amphibious, distributed, information, and 
counterinsurgency operations (COIN). Each warfighting function is detailed as follows 
and delivers a blueprint for software design that can enhance operational reach of the 
combatant commander. 
1. Command and Control 
As stated in MCWP 5-1 (2010), by having authority and direction over attached 
or assigned forces, commanders display command and control. Command and control 
enable commanders to convey their intent and decisions in concert with receiving 
feedback (MCWP 5-1, 2010). Command and control involve “arranging personnel, 
equipment, and facilities to allow the commander to extend his influence over the force 
during the planning and conduct of military operations” (MCWP 5-1, 2010, Appendix B, 
para. 3). Command and control provides a balance between the art and science of Marine 
Corps theory.  
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2. Maneuver 
In JP 1-02 (2012), Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, the DOD defines maneuver as “the employment of forces in the operational area 
through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect 
to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.” (p. 163, para. 9) Maneuver allows for 
distribution or concentration of capabilities in support of the commander’s concept of 
operation (CONOP). The Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy expands the 
concept of maneuver to include taking action in any dimension, whether temporal, 
psychological, or technological, to gain an advantage. In COIN operations, for example, 
forces may achieve advantages through key leader engagements, provision of security, 
governance, economics, and the rule of law. PAE provides commanders the ability to task 
multiple users either one-to-one relationship, or a one to many/many to many/many to 
one relationship and graphically watch the unit’s maneuver using the execution matrix 
automation. 
3. Fires 
In JP 1-02 (2010), the DOD defines fires “as the use of weapon systems to create 
a specific lethal or non- lethal effect on the target.” (p. 96, para. 9)Fires harass, suppress, 
neutralize, or destroy accomplish the targeting objective, which may be to disrupt, delay, 
limit persuade, or influence. Fires include the collective and coordinated use of target 
acquisition systems, direct and indirect fire weapons, and other lethal and nonlethal 
means (MCWP 5-1, 2010). Fires are traditionally used in concert with maneuver 
(combined arms), which helps shape the battlespace, setting conditions for decisive 
action. As seen in PAE, using the surface-to-surface fires function lets commanders 
provide covering fire against enemy units while visually tracking units on the map (PAE 
Manual, 2014). 
4. Intelligence 
Intelligence enables the commander to gain an understanding of the adversary, 
operational environment, and identifies the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) and 
critical vulnerabilities (MCWP 5-1, 2010). It aids the commanders and staffs in problem 
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framing, alerts them to new opportunities, and helps assess the effects of actions within 
the battlespace. An example in PAEs is the significant actions (SigActs) feature, which 
allows the user to view significant actions with user-defined filters and correlating these 
actions to various calendars to help model predictions for future actions within an event 
type (PAE Manual, 2014). This warfighting function supports and integrates the overall 
operational effort, and must focus on the commander’s intelligence requirements (MCWP 
5-1, 2010). 
5. Logistics 
As noted in MCWP 5-1 (2010), logistics comprises all activities needed to move 
and sustain military forces. At the tactical level, logistics is combat service support (CSS) 
that deals with feeding, fueling, arming, and maintaining troops and supplies (MCWP 5-
1, 2010). Logistic functions like supply, maintenance, transportation, and other services 
define tactical logistics (MCWP 5-1, 2010). PAE provides a robust suite of software 
extensions that enable users to plan both at a high level (theater level) for general 
logistical requirements and at a low level (battalion or company) to assist the logistician 
at the tactical level (PAE Manual, 2014). 
6. Force Protection 
Force protection is the measures taken to preserve the force’s combat capability, 
which allows the commander to apply at a specific time and place (MCWP 5-1, 2010). 
Force protection is those measures the force takes to remain combat capable. Force 
protection safeguards friendly COG and protects, conceals, reduces, or eliminates 
friendly critical vulnerabilities. 
F. MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS 
The MCPP is a process that allows staffs to link the Marine Corps warfighting 
philosophy (MCWP 5-1, 2010). By leveraging PAE, MCPP becomes not only linked to 
the theory, but to C2 systems within the Marine Corps. MCPP is designed for the 
commander to take on a central role as a decision maker and provides a systematic 
process that organizes the thoughts of the commanders and their staffs. The intuitive 
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process of MCPP applies to all levels of command and staff actions (MCWP 5-1, 2010). 
As noted in MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2, both commanders and staffs who have longer 
planning horizons and access to more information, will lean toward using the formal and 
comprehensive approach to the MCPP. Having commanders and staffs lean toward using 
the formal and comprehensive approach to the MCPP falls in line with TAM and 
provides a good metric to establish validate PAEs PEOU and PU.  
Conversely, commanders and staffs with less information and shorter planning 
horizons will be able to scale/modify the MCPP process to meet their objective/task 
(MCWP 5-1, 2010). Again, a great illustration of PAE scalability is provided as seen 
when commanders use the expeditionary operations planning function, which allows the 
user the ability to plan amphibious, heliborne, or air assault operations inside an overall 
tactical plan (PAE Manual, 2014). Additionally, MCPP provides a platform to develop 
planning activities and transmit the plan to subordinates for the commanders and their 
staffs (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 2012).  
As illustrated in MCWP 5-1, by using MCPP, multiple levels of command can 
concurrently plan, while having a general understanding of the mission and commanders’ 
intent. MCPP develops a systematic procedure for analyzing a problem, developing and 
wargaming COAs against that problem, equating friendly COAs against the 
commanders’ criteria and each other, selecting a COA, and preparing an operation order 
for execution (MCWP 5-1, 2010). As shown in MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 (2012), MCPP 
organizes the planning process into six coherent steps as shown in Figure 5 (MSTP, 
2012).  
An analysis of these six steps and how they are automated through the use of PAE 
will exemplify the values (increasing productivity, making the job easier, usefulness, 
effectiveness, overall job performance, and working more quickly) associated with PU 
(Segars & Grover, 1993).  
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Figure 5.  Marine Corps Planning Process (from MSTP, 2012) 
1. Problem Framing 
As noted in MCWP 5-1 (2010), the purpose of problem framing is to enhance 
understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. Problem framing allows 
commanders and staffs to articulate what, when, and why a unit must accomplish a 
mission or task (MCWP 5-1). MCWP 5-1 continues to state problem framing may begin 
as an informal response to indications and warnings, or more formally, when an order or 
directive (including the HHQ mission and tasks to subordinate commands) is received. 
Design does not end with problem framing because the situation constantly evolves and 
requires the commanders to review, and possibly modify, their design (MSTP Pamphlet 
5-0.2 2012). As seen in Figure 6, injects are gathered during problem framing to allow 
the commanders and staffs to continue activities that will develop results for both HHQ 
and subordinate commands. PAE provides a collaborative environment with other 
systems that provide information gathering that help commanders and staffs problem 
frame. As seen using PAE’s planning assistant, which provides a collaborative 
environment that allows changes to be made to the checklist and posting documents to an 
accessible location, allows them to be shared by other users in the chain of command 
(PAE Manual, 2014). PAE’s planning assistant provides a link with Segars and Grover’s 
(1993) concept of values associated with PU.  
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Figure 6.  Problem Framing (from MSTP, 2012) 
2. Course of Action Development  
As noted in MCWP 5-1 (2010), COA development allows staffs and planners to 
develop multiple options that allow the unit to complete the mission and the 
commanders’ intent. Design helps to inform the commanders’ intent and guidance, and 
provides options for the commanders while continuing to refine the understanding of the 
environment and problem (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 2012). To be distinguishable, each 
COA must employ different means or methods that address the essential tasks while 
incorporating the commanders’ intent and guidance. As seen in Figure 7, planners use the 
products carried forward from problem framing to generate options or COAs that satisfy 
the mission in accordance with the commanders’ intent and guidance. PAE provides 
several interfaces that allow commanders and staffs to develop COAs. An example is 
PAE’s GUI, which facilities COA development by allowing planners to use individual 
menus, click specific buttons on the toolbars, or use right-click options to create tasks.  
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Figure 7.  Course of Action Development (from MSTP, 2012) 
3. Course of Action War Game 
The COA war game involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to 
the threat and the battle space (MCWP 5-1, 2010). All friendly COA is war gamed 
against selected threat COAs. COA wargaming assists the planners in identifying relative 
strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA 
(MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 2012). Additionally, COA wargaming identifies branches and 
potential sequels that may require additional planning. Short of executing the COA, 
wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA 
(MCWP 5-1, 2010). As seen in Figure 8, planners use the products carried forward from  
COA development to provide information that will allow commanders and staffs to select 
a COA that best satisfies the mission in accordance with the commanders’ intent and 
guidance. PAE provides a wargaming function but does not determine success or failure; 
PAE assists the user in creating multiple COA, then war game them. This wargaming can 
take two forms, manual and automated. At the end of the war games, PAE will compare 
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the war games to determine which COA is stronger based on a series of criteria that the 
user can modify, but the user must make determinations of success or failure (PAE 
Manual, 2014).  
 
Figure 8.  Course of Action War Game (from MSTP, 2012) 
4. Course of Action Comparison and Decision 
The commanders’ friendly COAs are first compared against established criteria, 
then against each other. Based on this comparison, the commanders select the COA that 
they believes will best accomplish the mission (MCWP 5-1, 2010). As of note, the COA 
comparison and decision process at lower echelons of command may simply be an 
informal exchange of information between the commanders and their staffs on the results 
of the war game (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 2012). MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 (2012) continues 
to state that at higher levels of command, the process is usually a formal sequence of 
activities that may involve COA evaluation, COA comparison, commanders’ decision, 
preparation of the concept of operation, and issuance of a warning order (WARNORD). 
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As noted in MCWP 5-1 (2010), COA comparison and decision require war gamed COAs 
with graphic and narrative, list of critical events and decision points, and information on 
the commanders’ evaluation criteria (see Figure 9). PAE provides an analytical approach 
by adding up all the combat values for each unit participating in a battle at a given time. 
It then modifies these numbers based on non-kinetic factors, places each unit in an attack 
or defend posture (hasty, deliberate, meeting an engagement delay), and then applies the 
relevant Command and General Staff College wargaming outcome to the result to 
determine losses for each side (PAE Manual, 2014). Furthermore, PAE provides 
commanders a decision matrix that details the criteria and weight of each of the COAs. 
 
Figure 9.  Course of Action Comparison and Decision (from MSTP, 2012) 
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5. Orders Development 
During orders development, the staffs take the commanders’ COA decision, 
mission statement, commanders’ intent and guidance, and develops orders to direct the 
actions of the unit (MCWP 5-1, 2010). As noted in MCWP 5-1 (2010), the development 
of the order begins during problem framing and continues throughout the process. 
Portions of the order, such as the mission statement and the CONOP, have been prepared 
during previous steps of the MCPP (MCWP 5-1, 2010). Furthermore, the order contains 
only critical or new information and not routine matters normally found in the standard 
operating procedures (SOP) (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 2012). Orders serve as the principal 
means by which the commanders express their decision, commanders’ intent, and 
guidance. Figure 10 identifies injects, activities, and results to support orders 
development. As seen in PAEs, OPLAN report generates a Microsoft Word document 
that includes all mission information and standard annex lists (PAE Manual, 2014). 
  
Figure 10.  Orders Development (from MSTP, 2012) 
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6. Transition 
Transition provides a successful shift from planning to execution. It enhances the 
situational awareness of those who will execute the order, maintains the intent of the 
CONOP, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo (MCWP 5-1, 2010). Transition 
may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful 
shift from planning to execution. It is a continuous process that requires a free flow of 
information between commanders and staffs by all available means (MSTP Pamphlet 5-
0.2 2012). A number of factors can influence how the transition step is conducted, such 
as echelon of command, mission complexity, and most importantly, available time. As 
Figure 11 illustrates, the injects, activities, and results columns must support the 
transition of information through all levels of command. As seen in PAE, two methods 
for presenting PowerPoint briefings and report features can assist commanders and staffs 
with writing an operations plan or order and disseminating the information to HHQ or 
subordinates.  
 
Figure 11.  Transition (from MSTP, 2012) 
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G. RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS  
The purpose of the R2P2 is to spend the least amount of time planning while 
providing the executing forces with the maximum time allowable to prepare for the 
mission. R2P2 enables a unit (such as a MEU) to receive, analyze, plan, and coordinate a 
mission within six hours of notification (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2 2012). The standard is to 
commence the mission within six hours of tasking. Mission commencement does not 
necessarily mean “landing the landing force” (p. 143, para. 1) or securing the objective. It 
could be as simple as launching a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) team. The point 
is some action of execution needs to occur within the six-hour time frame (MCWP 5-1).  
1. Rapid Planning Considerations  
The following points may provide context when using R2P2. First, anticipate the 
mission by looking at potential missions and areas of interest prior to deployment. Using 
theater threat briefs, cultural briefs, and economic briefs regarding the regions in which 
expeditionary forces will be operating, helps to build situational awareness (SA). Second, 
establish and validate SOPs to establish a battle rhythm for a unit to conduct operations. 
A process is needed to develop a battle rhythm in which all units will operate in a 
cohesive manner. This process becomes a unit’s SOP. Third, a planning cell must 
establish various missions’ sets and their required planning spaces should be established 
prior to deployment. The staffs should know the roles and functions of each of the 
planning cells. Fourth, information flow is essential when using both MCPP and R2P2. 
Knowledge is needed to make informed decisions, and focusing on the commander’s 
critical information requirements (CCIR) mitigates information saturation and allows the 
staffs to concentrate on the information the commanders have deemed critical to 
accomplishing the mission. Last, solid communications provide the link for commanders 
and staffs to real time information. 
2. Marine Corps Planning Process and Rapid Response Planning 
Process 
The R2P2 planning process is the same as the MCPP with some modifications 
due to time constraints. The problem-framing step is essentially the same. During R2P2, 
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COA development is limited to three COAs; the COA war game is informal and two of 
the three COAs are compared. Once a COA is selected, the confirmation brief constitutes 
the order, and rehearsals are the primary means for subordinates to show understanding 
of what is needed in mission execution.  
H. SUMMARY 
As noted by Maier and Rechtin (2002), warfare is an open collaborative system 
because no one stakeholder has total “coercive power to run the system.” As the 
complexities of military operations continues to change, no one leader exercises total 
control but ultimately depends on cooperation from other stakeholders for the 
achievement of operational orders (Checkland & Poulter, 2006). As seen, PAE’s 
collaboration server was developed to work on an Enhanced Position Location and 
Reporting System (EPLRS) network, with most graphics being transmitted using 
minimum bandwidth consumption. This chapter outlines theories, tenets, and process that 
increase the persevered usefulness of PAE. As seen in Figure 12, TAM continues to build 
on the framework of PU and PEOU, which will influence the BI, and ultimately, the 
adoption of PAE.  
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Figure 12.  PU Using TAM (from Davis, 1998) 
As exemplified in MCWP 5-1 (2010), commanders and staffs need information 
for both MCPP and R2P2 in the form they can quickly and easily understand during 
planning and decision making. The Marine Corps planning theory and process provide 
well for planning at the tactical level at which the system is easily understood from 
experience or previous study. However, it is at the higher levels where its weaknesses is 
exposed. The MCPP lacks robust tools and applications for creating an operational 
architecture. The reduction in resources and the global nature of political and social 
unrest force the U.S. military to analyze efforts to use integrated information that can 
lower uncertainty and risk in military operations (McKearney, 2013). As a solution, PAE 
enables a robust platform that provides planners a doctrinal structure that allows 
consistency in information. As seen using TAM, the use of PAEs will increase the 
knowledge of both commanders and staffs, which influences the behavioral intention, and 
PU of technology.  
Chapter III details the technology platforms within a MAGTF and continues to 
illustrate that PAE, if leveraged correctly, will provide a robust platform for the PU and 
PEOU of technology.  
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III. MARINE CORPS INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The MAGTF employs information systems to support the collection, processing, 
and exchange of information. Information systems can accelerate and automate routine 
functions to allow commanders and staffs to concentrate on those aspects of command 
and control requiring expertise, understanding, and intuition. As stated in MSTP 
Pamphlet 6-0.2 (2012), in every aspect of operations, these systems serve the 
commanders and their staffs by facilitating rapid, secure information flow, shared 
situational awareness, informed decision making, and swift dissemination of decisions. 
The success of the MAGTF in the modern battlespace depends heavily on the effective 
employment of information systems (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). To understand the Marine 
Corps technology adoption challenges better, specifically using PAE, the continued 
analysis of TAM will add to the framework provide in Chapter II. This chapter provides 
the context of current systems within the MAGTF that allow commanders operational 
reach. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates where PAE is within JTCW, which will 
provide a better understanding of PAE’s functionality. Furthermore, this chapter builds 
on the element of perceived EOU, which is “the degree in which a person believes that 
using a particular system would be free of effort” (Davis, 1989). 
B. MAGTF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The C2 process empowers commanders to exercise command across the span of 
their forces (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). It establishes a context for the commanders to 
develop an understanding of the situation, determine actions needed to be required, and 
through technology, transmit information to subordinate commanders. Furthermore, C2 
allows the commanders’ staffs and planners to monitor the performance of information 
and evaluate the results. C2 also requires an understanding in how people, information, 
and support (Figure 13) influence the quality of C2 during operations while influencing 
their BI towards a particular technology.  
 30 
 
Figure 13.  Three Elements of Command and Control 
(from MSTP Pamphlet 6-0.2) 
1. People  
People are the foundation of C2 systems. People are the starting point for C2, and 
with a common philosophy, they can gather information, make decisions, take action, 
communicate, and cooperate with one another to accomplish a common goal (MCWP 3-
40.1). Ultimately, through the use of information, people are empowered within a 
command to create diffusion to adopt a new idea, behavior, or product (Rogers, 1995). 
2. Information 
Information provides a context of reality, and influences decisions and actions. As 
noted in MCDP 6 (2003), information is represented by several mediums, like words, 
letters, numbers, images, and symbols that allow commanders and staffs an 
understanding of things, events, ideas, and values. Additionally, information provides a 
platform for commanders, staffs, and planners to assess communicate and modify actions 
during operations. As illustrated in MCDP 6 (1996), information can be used for two 
basic uses.  
 To help create situational awareness as the basis for a decision 
 To direct and coordinate actions in the execution of the decision 
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3. Support 
Support structure aids the people who create, disseminate, and use information. It 
includes the organizations, procedures, equipment, systems, facilities, training, education, 
and doctrine that support C2 (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). 
C. INFORMATION THEORY 
It is important to recognize that information comprises everything from raw data 
to detailed data that has been comprehensively filtered and analyzed. As seen in Figure 
14, MCWP 3-40.1 illustrated a four-step cognitive process that transitions raw data into 
comprehensive information that provides SA. This cognitive process supports Roger’s 
(1995) innovation-decision process, which involves five main steps: knowledge, 
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. Innovation (technologies) 
enables the collection of raw data as seen in information theory and MAGTF information 
management. 
 
Figure 14.  Information Hierarchy (from MSTP Pamphlet 6-0.2) 
1. Collect Raw Data 
Collected raw data (knowledge) can come from a variety of sources, such as 
satellite signals, radio signals, meteorological data from a weather balloon, or even bar-
coded logistic data scanned from the side of the container (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). This 
data can be transmitted over analog or digital media. Ultimately, the information must be 
translated into usable data.  
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2. Process Data 
As noted in MCWP 3-40.1 (2003), the act of handling data like decoding, 
filtering, and other varied means, allow commanders and staffs to glean the necessary 
information for a specific mission. Once data has been processed, it may have immediate 
value for Marines in close contact with the enemy. Such information is known as combat 
information, which is ordinarily very perishable and must be propagated to units as 
rapidly as possible (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). 
3. Analyze and Evaluate 
Through examination and evaluation, data is transformed into information and 
intelligence that develops the knowledge needed to assist decision making; e.g., the 
analysis of intelligence information provides a picture of the enemy situation (MCWP 3-
40.1, 2003). While a few elements of that image may have been provided by combat 
information, interpretation and evaluation afford a more realistic and comprehensive 
understanding of the enemy situation. 
4. Situational Awareness  
As illustrated in MCWP 3-40.1 (2003) SA entails developing an understanding of 
the situation on the basis of the information available. Understanding is the result of 
applying human judgment based on individual experience, expertise, and intuition to 
achieve a full appreciation of the battlespace. This understanding is what is known as SA, 
and it provides a sound basis for operational decisions. SA allows the commander to 
anticipate events and to uncover critical vulnerabilities for exploitation (MCDP 6, 1996). 
As staffs endeavor to achieve an understanding of the circumstances, staffs must 
recognize that time works against them. Staffs may not be able to gain complete SA 
before acting. Developing SA with limited and uncertain information under severe time 
constraints is the fundamental challenge of command and control. 
D. MAGTF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
As described in MCWP 3-40.1 (2003), information management allows a flow of 
pertinent information that establishes a foundation for all facets of the planning, decision, 
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execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycles of organic and discrete units. Through 
automation, information can be displayed dynamically to provide a rapid immersion of 
information that allows for efficient decision making. Effective information management 
delivers decisive information in an appropriate fashion to those who need it in a structure 
that can be quickly understood. Furthermore, information management includes all 
actions that involve recognizing, handling, refining, fusing, processing, and directing 
information (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). This assembly of information provides an 
understanding of the battlespace that allows the commanders to develop and analyze 
decisions better and communicate those decisions. The commanders must leverage 
information management to maximize SA, quality information, and establish CCIRs.  
1. Obtaining Situational Awareness 
As defined in MCWP 3-40.1 (2003), SA is advancing the understanding of the 
situation on the basis of the information accessible. Additionally, the understanding of the 
information received is the effect of applying human interpretation based on personal 
experience, expertise, and intuition to gain a full visualization of the battlespace as seen 
in Figure 15. As illustrated by McKearney (2013), this understanding is what constitutes 
SA and provides a sound basis for operational decisions. SA allows the commanders to 
anticipate events and to uncover critical vulnerabilities for exploitation. Developing SA 
quality of information is critical, and with limited and uncertain information, coupled 
with severe time limitations, becomes the central challenge of C2 (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003).  
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Figure 15.  Information to Situational Awareness (from MSTP Pamphlet 6-0.2) 
2. Quality Information 
As noted in MCWP 3-40.1 (2003), information must have specific qualities to 
have value. Information that lacks relevance, timeless, accuracy, and completeness may 
be detrimental to decision making. Relevance of information is essential to the mission, 
and if information is provided without filtering, it often detracts from the commanders’ 
ability to make timely, effective decisions. Timeliness of information must be accessible 
at the proper place and time to be beneficial and information management procedures 
must ensure the timely, unimpeded flow of relevant information (McKearney, 2013). 
Accuracy of information must be as detailed as possible, and through information 
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systems, must be collected, collated, and displayed for staffs to evaluate and make 
decisions as to its accuracy, timeliness, and relevance. Completeness of information 
allows commanders to have relevant, timely, and accurate information during decision 
making. Nevertheless, if staffs and subordinates are aware of the commanders’ intent and 
CCIRs, they can provide the information required through two easy steps (MSTP 6-0.2, 
2012). 
Objectively, information must be provided in the most undistorted, factual, and 
unbiased way possible. Any assumptions or interpretations should be highlighted 
(MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). 
As illustrated in MSTP 6-0.2 (2012), usability is the display or presentation of 
information that must be understandable and useful. Standard and clear formats, symbols, 
and terms should be used. Information exchanged and presented in nonstandard methods 
delays interpretation and is more easily misunderstood; thereby, leading to longer 
decision and execution cycles, and ultimately, to less reliable decisions (MCWP 3-40.1, 
2003). 
3. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
MCDP 6 (1996) establishes only a fraction of the accessible information that in 
theory can be collected and processed rapidly enough to support decision making. As 
stated previously, the commanders identify CCIRs to concentrate and regulate the 
gathering and processing of data. CCIRs represent information regarding the enemy—its 
own forces, and the environment that the commanders deem critical to maintaining 
situational awareness, planning future activities, and making timely decisions. 
Designating CCIRs decreases the amount of information, which needs to be reported to 
the commanders and guides staff efforts on collecting relevant and timely information 
(MSTP 6-0.2, 2012).  
E. SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
The capability to share a common picture of the battlespace has been assigned the 
highest priority in current efforts to improve C2 capabilities (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). 
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Furthermore, at the combatant commander level, this battlespace picture is a common 
operating picture (COP), which is a composite of the battlespace pictures of subordinate 
commanders’ common tactical picture (CTP) (MTSP 6-0.2, 2012). The COP/CTP 
enables commanders in different geographic scenes and services to observe and evaluate 
the military situation collaboratively, make decisions on current operations, and transmit 
those decisions to the appropriate forces (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). Procedures must also be 
in place to track and display properly the data being submitted to a database driving the 
CTP/COP.  
1. Common Operational Picture/Common Tactical Picture  
COP information is required at all levels (MCWP 3-40.1, 2003). Commanders 
control the information in their areas of responsibility by establishing a COP or CTP 
correlation site to pull information together, build a general tactical data set, and apply 
overlays, and filter information (MSTP 6-0.2, 2012). Subordinate commanders develop 
and submit their CTPs, which are correlated and fused for inclusion in the next HHQ 
COP. The chart application of the JTCW is the primary tool used for viewing the data in 
the COP/CTP, which generates the situational display from the track database (MTSP 6-
0.2012). Accuracy of the situational display depends completely on the quality and 
timeliness of data information from multiple sources and the effective correlation and 
fusion of that data (MCWP 30.1, 2003).  
2. Track Database Management 
The COP/CTP is developed through the concept of tracks. A track represents an 
object in graphic or text format. The position and characteristics of that object—which 
may be a friendly or enemy ship, aircraft or ground unit—are collated from sensors and 
other data sources including manual input. Normally, tracking is through a combination 
of automated and manual procedures. Although much of the track data is fed into the 
database, correlated, and displayed automatically, the data must be managed efficiently to 
prevent obsolete tracks from being displayed (MSTP 6-0.2, 2012). Each command level 
that generates input for a COP/CTP has the responsibility for track management: 
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entering, correlating, updating, fusing, de-conflicting, and otherwise, maintaining 
assigned tracks, which is done using information systems. 
F. MAGTF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
As noted in MCWP 3-40.1 (2003), the MAGTF information systems are a part of 
the MAGTF C2 support structure. The MAGTF communication and information systems 
plan supports communication requirements, which include the networks required for 
information system connectivity (MTSP 6-0.2, 2012). As illustrated in Figure 16, all 
these plans link the six warfighting functions to 30 different systems. Paragraphs 1 
through 6 provide descriptions of all the C2 systems currently in use by the MAGTF 
(MTSP 6-0.2, 2012). Theses systems provide a link between information thoery, MAGTF 
information management, while framing the innovation-decision process.  
As Roger (1995) discribes, knowledge occurs when an innovation’s existence 
(PAE) is gained and a desire to gain some understanding of how it functions. Persuasion 
is a change in an individual’s attitude toward the innovation (PAE), which is either 
favorable or unfavorable (Rogers, 1995). Rogers continues to define decision as an 
individual selecting to adopt or reject an existing innovation (PAE). The following 
section details the current systems with the MAGTF, and provides the finshing elements 
(implementation, and confirmation) of the innovation-decision process. 
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Figure 16.  Information System by Warfighting Functions 
(from MSTP 6-0.2, 2012) 
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G. MAGTF COMMON OPERATING PICTURE  
1. Joint Tactical COP Workstation  
To finish the analysis of the innovation-decision process, an implementation and 
confirmation occur by either using the innovation—this case JTCW—and seeks to 
validate the decision to using a particular innovation (Roger, 1995). According to USMC 
Concepts and Programs (2011), the JTCW provides a military C2 platform for enhanced 
SA. Operational and tactical decision making is accomplished through a Windows-based 
tactical COP workstation, which is a suite of applications designed for battalion and 
higher level commands. The JTCW supersedes the Command and control personal 
computer (C2PC) software by consolidating C2PC with other joint applications into a 
single software load to provide comprehensive aptitude for C2 planning and 
interoperability (USMC Concepts and Programs, 2011).  
The warfighter is provided an enhanced platform through the JTCW 
interoperability and allows a conduit between MAGTF systems for command, control, 
communications, computers, and systems for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) (USMC Concepts and Programs, 2011). As seen in Figure 17, 
JTCW gives an initial point of entry for the COP. JTCW allows users to establish a 
collaborative environment by viewing map data, transfer general message traffic, plan 
and distribute route information, view and update track data, develop and distribute 
overlays, and provide general C2 planning information (MSTP 6-0.2, 2012). JTCW 
software is loaded on the intelligence operations workstation (IOW) and is integrated into 
the MAGTF combat operations centers (COC) (USMC Concepts and Programs, 2011). 
Untimely, at the end of the innovation-decision process, a decision is made to make full 
use of an innovation (i.e., adoption), or not use the innovation (i.e., do not adopted). In 
this case, JTCW has been adopted and is the central C2 system in a MAGTF. 
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Figure 17.  JTCW Model 
H. SUMMARY 
Wentz, Barry, and Starr (2009) explain that over the last 20–30 years, the Marine 
Corps’ C2 environments have evolved because of operational requirements. This 
environment is conducive for BI of an end user and builds the understanding of PU and 
PEOU. Although the Marine Corps has experienced progress in enterprise-wide IT 
management, supplementary research must focus on current C2 systems to provide an 
operational reach for MAGTF operations. Creating networked capabilities is a critical 
component of the MAGTF approach to command and controlling Marine forces. 
Commander, staff, and unit are all known as nodes and can be a producer, processor, and 
user of information (McKearney, 2013).  
As noted by Wentz, Barry, and Starr (2009), all information must be readily 
available for these nodes without overloading or paralyzing them with irrelevant 
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information. Furthermore, many of the nodes in the system are required to perform 
multiple functions; therefore, the essence of MAGTF C2 is decentralized and highly 
adaptive (McKearney, 2013). MAGTF C2 uses the communication’s architecture and 
information systems to nurture and use the human capacity for shared understanding, 
absolute information, and instinctive decision making, which has influenced the adoption 
of JTCW. The combined network effect, produced by organizing all nodes into an 
information-rich, collaborative, global system, is needed to increase these inherently 
human qualities (Wentz, Barr, & Starr, 2009).  
To maintain the superiority of these MAGTF information capabilities, the Marine 
Corps must have a plan to integrate new and proven technologies continually as they 
become viable and affordable. The increasing numbers of information systems that do not 
integrate standardized data place an ever increasing burden on the time and funding 
required for operations, maintenance, and training (Wentz, Barr, & Starr, 2009). As an 
extension of JTCW—that is already a system of record—PAE provides a power platform 
for information gathers and support BI through PAE’s PU and PEOU. See Figure 18. The 
following chapter provides background and outlines PAE’s special functions while using 











The purpose of Chapter IV is to provide background for PAE and analysis to 
answer the questions presented in this thesis. Furthermore, by using the Expectation 
Continuance Model (ECM), a framework is developed to determine if PAE is a viable 
technology innovation and build PAE’s PU and PEOU. According to Bhattacherjee 
(2001), post-adoption expectation, satisfaction, confirmation, and continued IT usage 
intention are elements of ECM that help identify areas of concerns in the adoption of 
technologies. As seen in Figure 19, PAE is a software extension designed for JTCW that 
supports planners in all aspects of planning. In conversation with Mr. Savinovich (2013), 
“PAE has been in the MAGTF since 2009, his concern is only 70 Marines have trained 
on PAE.” Savinovich (2013) continues to state that PAE frees planners from most of the 
routine tasks associated with operational planning, and by using PAE, planners can focus 
on higher level concepts missions, plans, tasks, and activities.  
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Figure 19.  JTCW Model with PAE 
PAE enables OPTs to use graphical and simulation technology during both MCPP 
and R2P2 sessions. Specifically, PAE allows planners to define tasks and see the effect of 
those tasks over a period of time while leveraging the simulation features that allow 
planners to replay tasks during each planning phase. Planners are able to use the GUI to 
import data from various databases to help in planning. Furthermore, as stated by 
Savinovich (2013), PAE permits multiple planners to share plans with others to create a 
collaborative environment during military operations. The aforementioned elements 
continue to frame the impact PAE will provide to commanders, staffs, and planners BI 
towards PAE’s PU and PEOU.  
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B. IS THERE AUTOMATION THAT WILL ENHANCE 
PLANNING DURING THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS? 
Automation can enhance any process if leveraged correctly as seen during the 
analysis of PAE. PAE provides planners with a tool called “the planning assistant,” 
which can be used in a collaborative environment. The planning assistant allows planners 
to collaborate on changes made to the checklist and post documents to an accessible 
location to allow information sharing in real time (Savinovich, 2013). As seen in Figure 
20, PAE enables a collaborative environment through the use of GUIs; these interfaces 
will take the planner through each step of MCPP and R2P2. These GUIs allow an 
increase in post-adoption expectation, which is defined as the related causes of a user’s 
level of satisfaction with IT (Bhattacherjee, 2001). 
Figure 20.  Planning Assistant (from Savinovich, 2013) 
As discussed during the COA development section earlier in this document, PAE 
allows planners to define many COAs, each with a separate user-defined name and set of 
properties (PAE Manual, 2013). Savinovich (2013) explains that once a planner defines a 
given COA, planners are able to re-use any task organizations or plans in various 
scenarios, which decreases the amount of time required for branch planning or “what-if” 
analyses. PAE provides a step in the right direction by linking current MAGTF C2 
systems (e.g., JTCW) and providing an intuitive platform for collaboration. Even more 
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importantly, PAE provides a doctrinal base process of MCPP that will enable the less 
experienced planner the ability to provide the commanders a consistent quality of 
information.  
C. HOW WILL PLANNING APPLICATION EXTENSION SOFTWARE 
DESIGN ENHANCE CAPABILITIES WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL 
PLANNING TEAM?  
PAE uses powerful behavioral models that give planners the science of war, 
which allows them the ability to focus more on the art of war (Savinovich, 2013). 
Moreover, PAE enhances the OPT’s ability to leverage AI. During wargaming, PAE 
leverages these behavioral models to provide OPTs the opportunity to compare several 
COAs at the same time. As seen in Figure 21, PAE allows planners to develop multiple 
COAs and then simulate them. During the simulation, PAE pulls information from Total 
Force Structure Management System (TFSMS) to develop a unit composition and 
organization. This information is later used to determine the range at which battle 
commences and to direct range fan values (i.e., the maximum distances a particular 
weapons platform can engage a target). 
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Figure 21.  WarGaming (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
PAE performs three fundamental battle calculi. During combined arms or close 
battles, PAE adds up all the combat values (relative combat power and strength, weapons 
ranges for each unit engaging) in a battle at a given time (PAE Manual, 2013). It then 
modifies these numbers based on non-kinetic factors, places each unit in an attack or 
defense posture (hasty or deliberate), and then applies the relevant Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) wargaming outcome to the result to determine losses for 
each side (Curry, 2013). 
1. Relative Combat Power  
Planners can review the RCP values associated with units assigned to the active 
COA during wargaming (PAE Manual, 2013). By using the RCP model, all aircraft, 
indirect fire, and direct fire systems are reduced to their RCP drawn from the National 
Simulation Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS (Curry, 2013). RCP methodology is a 
mathematical method for solving complex battlefield problems. Each platform is 
assigned a point value based off the National Simulation Center numbers. As seen in 
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Figure 22, RCP function allows planners to select friendly and enemy units and then 
display aggregated RCP values and ratios of friendly to enemy units for the selected 
units.  
 
Figure 22.  Relative Combat Power Details Window (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
To illustrate this scenario, Savinovich (2013) explains that a M1A1 tank is worth 
950 combat points and a T-55 tank is worth 500 combat points. The base line number 
gives a USMC tank a 2:1 advantage over the enemy tank. This number is rolled up to the 
unit level. Thus, a USMC tank company is worth 13,300 points (14 tanks X 950 points) 
and the enemy tank company at 70% strength is worth 3,500 points (7 tanks X 500 
points). Therefore, the RCP is 3.8:1. PAE rounds this number up to 4:1. The posture of 
the two sides (each side has as many units as desired) is entered. Therefore, in this 
example, the tank company is conducting a hasty attack against a hasty defense, and for 
every one of the tanks lost to combat, the enemy would lose six tanks (exchange ratio of 
1:6).  
This simulation shows the utility PAE brings to planners fingertips. PAE enables 
planners to account for not only tangibles (e.g., M1A1) but also the intangibles like 
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leadership, training, and morale. Planners are able to increase the combat power of any 
unit incrementally using the sliders at the bottom of the unit status tab of the unit 
properties window (Savinovich, 2013). Using the slider not only effects changes to the 
RCP but the battle duration of the unit as well. 
2. Battle Duration  
Battle duration is established by calculating the average rate of march against 
enemy resistance using CGSC (Curry, 2013). In this simulation, each unit is provided a 
defensive footprint for frontage and depth of a security zone and Main Battle Area 
(MBA). As illustrated in Figure 23, the terrain, RCP of the forces, the unit’s posture of 
both attacker and defender, and day/night condition, determines the speed of the attack 
through the defense (PAE Manual, 2013). When the attack has reached the end of the 
enemy defense, PAE will terminate the action. 
 
Figure 23.  Close Battle Duration Calculator (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
3. Indirect Fire  
PAE allows planners to attack enemy targets using artillery, mortars, and rockets 
only. In this model, PAE does not use RCP, but calculates the effects of the round type 
and caliber on the target array being engaged (Savinovich, 2013). Each indirect fire 
 50 
platform has data about its caliber, sustained and maximum rate of fire, and reload times 
within PAE. As seen in Figure 24, the planner tells the system to create an indirect fire 
event, and then inputs how much attrition to achieve. Savinovich (2013) continues to 
explain that PAE examines the target unit composition and determines how many rounds 
of the ammunition type available in the firing unit will be required to achieve the desired 
end state, based on the target unit’s status. PAE then determines how long it takes to fire 
that number of rounds from the available tube or launchers from the designated firing 
units. PAE pulls information from the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMS), 
which determines how many rounds are required for a particular mission (Curry, 2013).  
 
Figure 24.  Surface to Surface Fires Editor (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
Furthermore, all combined arms combat calculations are resultant of the CGSC 
model (Curry, 2013). Curry (2013) continues to illustrate that this model compares 
overall RCP of the contending forces (direct fire + indirect fire + air defense fires) against 
one another and applies friendly and adversary force postures (hasty/deliberate attack, 
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hasty/deliberate defense, meeting engagement and delay), the depth of the enemy 
defense, and the light conditions to determine the following. 
 Attrition on both sides 
 Victory or defeat status (used to determine recovery of damaged assets) 
 Duration (how long it takes attacker to reach the rear of the enemy’s 
defensive depth) 
Indirect fires results are then determined by the platform level composition of the 
target unit, target effects desired, caliber and rounds being fired, and the posture of the 
target unit (PAE Manual, 2013). If a user changes duration or effect, the alternate value is 
modified. Having responsive analytics is extremely powerful when planners are engaged 
in wargaming as it provides clarity on ammunition management and the associated cost 
of a particular operation. 
4. Air Strike 
PAE has an air-to-ground attack module, which allows planners to specify an air 
attack of a ground target. PAE then examines the targets unit type and applies a 
munition’s mix. As noted by Savinovich (2013), an infinite number of munitions mixes 
are available. PAE provides several mix options, such as three mixes for air defense 
(ADA) targets, one for air interdiction (AI) targets (bridges/buildings), four for armor 
targets, three for field artillery (FA) targets, two for infantry, and one for the ship (naval 
targets).  
In an air strike (AS) simulation, PAE always flies two aircraft (A/C) (sorties per 
mission) and takes A/C from the nearest unit with A/C assets available. PAE then applies 
the munitions against the target array to determine the loss to the target (Savinovich, 
2013). As illustrated in Figure 25, planners can override the results at the platform level, 
which provides a unique interface that allows planners to use their expertise (art of war) 
to enhance PAE’s simulation power (science of war). This simulation power does not end 
with AS but is very robust in air assault (AA) planning. 
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Figure 25.  Air Attack Attributes Tab (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
5. Air Assault  
The AA feature enables planners to simulate AA for missions like 
Helicopterborne Operations, which is one of PAE’s special functions. As seen in Figure 
26, the AA interface is intuitive and planners select the following sequence. 
 Task (air assault) 
 Select the target (landing zone) 
 Select the execution matrix (start time) 
 Enter Duration 
 Click Create. A task (inverted arrow) appears in the execution matrix 
(PAE Manual, 2013).  
 
Figure 26.  Air Assault Interface (from PAE Manual, 2013)  
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Figure 27 shows PAE does not just create graphics; it generates reports like zone 
diagram, which allows planners to select pickup or landing zones (PAE Manual, 2013). 
As Savinovich (2013) explains, PAE does not stop there. By entering the appropriate 
information, PAE allows planners to develop a route card that selects the air corridor, 
pickup zones (PZ), landing zone (LZ), checklist, and the air assault checklist. 
Furthermore, PAE will generate a GO/NO GO criteria for intel, maneuver, fires, ADA, 
main operating base (MOB)/Career Management Operations Branch (CMOB), CSS, C2, 
and if they have been completed (PAE Manual, 2013).  
 
Figure 27.  Zone Diagram (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
6. Expeditionary Operations  
Expeditionary operations is another one of PAE’s special functions. The 
Expeditionary operations planning function allows planners the ability to plan 
amphibious, heloborne, or AA operations inside an overall tactical plan, as seen in Figure 
28. Operations prior to, during, and after the assault are integrated in time, space, and unit 
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status (Savinovich, 2013). Planners are able to configure assault forces, amphibious 
shipping and landing craft, and aircraft to meet the expected state of forces at time of an 
assault. Plans menu provide users with report templates that kick start the order writing 
process like mission brief, ground command element (GCE) landing, landing field (LF) 
landing and aviation combat element (ACE)/LF aviation landing plan (PAE Manual, 
2013). 
 
Figure 28.  Expeditionary Graphic Interface (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
7. Logistics  
The planning application logistics features enable users to plan at both a high 
level (theater level) for general logistical requirements and at a low level (battalion or 
company) to assist the logistician at the tactical level (Savinovich, 2013). The logistics 
editor has various tabs that interact with each other and are based off the tactical plan. All 
units located on the map are considered when the logistical plan is created (PAE Manual, 
2013). The PAE reasoning engine uses the logistical planning algorithms of both the 
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Marine Corps and the Army (Curry, 2013). Some of the algorithms are based on the 
personnel count and the location of the unit, others are based on the platforms of a unit, 
and still others are based on the unit. The outputs of the logistical calculations are 
expressed in pounds, gallons, or down to the appropriate national stock number (NSN), 
line item number (LIN) or table of allowance material control number (TAMCN) level of 
detail (Savinovich, 2013).  
As Figure 29 illustrates, users may establish three support relationships: direct 
support (DS), area support (AS), and general support (GS). The calculation of supply 
requirements remain the same regardless of the support relationship, however, the load 
configuration is calculated for DS and GS units (PAE Manual, 2013).  
 
Figure 29.  Logistic Support GUI (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
PAE understands and applies the principles of priority of support, priority of 
supply, and priority for maintenance to friendly forces as seen in Figure 30 (PAE, 
Manual, 2013). Defaults are set for priority of supply based off the general posture 
selected when the mission was created, and defaults for the maintenance priorities based 
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off the RCP factors (Savinovich, 2013). The defaults are applied to provide a departure 
point for planning or use in a time-constrained environment. The users can manually 
change the setting to reflect their needs (PAE, Manual, 2013). If the plan is divided into 
phases, different priorities can be established for the various phases.  
 
Figure 30.  Logistic Priority Tab (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
PAE’s logistical release computes the calculation of Class I, II, IIIB, IV, VI, VII, 
and Class VIII to the company level of detail (Curry, 2013). The supplies are calculated 
to the pound, gallon or NSN level of detail, and are notionally placed on trucks based on 
the weight, cube, or volume, and delivered to a unit (PAE Manual, 2013). Figure 31 is a 
detailed XML printout by vehicle of the supplies required to support the forces down to 
company level (Savinovich, 2013).  
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Figure 31.  Logistics Report (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
Logistic performance data comes from a variety of sources. The classes of 
material within PAE are described as follows, and are derived from the Strategic 
Planning Branch at Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Ft. Lee, VA (Curry, 
2013). 
 Class I—Subsistence, gratuitous (free) health and comfort items 
 Class II—Individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, 
hand tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies, 
and equipment  
 Class III—Petroleum, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic, and insulating oils 
 Class IV—Construction materials, including installed equipment, and all 
fortification and barrier materials 
 Class V—Ammunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, 
detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and associated 
items 
 Class VI—Personal demand items 
 Class VIII—Medical material  
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 Class IX—Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies, and 
subassemblies 
 Class X—Material to support nonmilitary programs, such as agriculture 
and economic development 
Logistic performance data figures are mainly used to determine consumption 
based on headcount, operation, and climate conditions. An example is Class I values 
found in the Strategic Planning Factors Branch Handbook. Whereas Class III (bulk) is 
based on a much more precise formula in which the movement or normal operating costs 
of the unit are determined based on time or distance of movement, or activity, and are 
compared against the number of vehicles by type (Curry, 2013). Curry (2013) continues 
to explain it is calculated in real time. As the number of fuel burning platforms changes 
over time (combat losses vs. maintenance returns), so will the information provided to the 
planner.  
As seen in Figure 32, Class I calculations consider the use of meals ready to eat 
(MRE) rations based on the tactical scenario and are editable by the user (PAE Manual, 
2013). Class II, IV, VIII, and IX are calculated based on pounds per person per day. Class 
V (artillery only) is based on the planned targets and considers the destruction and target 
type. Class VI is based on headcount and scheduled for delivery every 10 days. Class VII 
is based on the planned loss rate after considering the correlation of forces matrix 
(COFM) output and maintenance repair times (PAE Manual, 2013). 
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Figure 32.  Logistics Window—Class I Tab (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
Delivery of supplies falls into two broad categories, from supplier to supplier, and 
from supplier to consumer. Deliveries of supplies from a supplier to supplier are often 
high demand or high usage items, and are based on an objective stockage level at any 
particular location (Savinovich, 2013). The timing of the delivery is based on the time 
distance factors of long haul (two trips a day) or short haul (four trips a day). For 
consumers, the delivery of rations and water is usually the driving factor for the delivery 
of all supplies. As such, consumers of supplies usually receive the supply distribution in 
the morning, afternoon, and evening hours near normal meal times (Savinovich, 2013). 
The resupply scheduler in PAE accommodates both suppliers and consumers as 
illustrated in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33.  Logistics Window—Resupply Tab (Supplier to consumer left, 
Supplier to Supplier right) (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
Savinovich (2013) explains during planning, PAE automatically maintains the 
unit’s status and provides planners a report of battle activity in which attrition of the asset 
is calculated. Maintenance teams then perform maintenance, and these resources are 
dynamically allocated during mission planning and execution. PAE uses the planning 
factors database to determine the amount of damage sustained by units during battle 
(Savinovich, 2013). Users can edit the values in the planning factors database to 
customize the data for their own mission (PAE Manual, 2013).  
As seen in Figure 34, PAE used an Ordnance School Manual to obtain planning 
factors for severity of damage based on combat outcome and unit posture (Curry, 2013). 
In the example, the assets declared damaged went into a category: non-repairable, battle 
damage assessment and repair (BDAR), level 2, level 3 or theater level maintenance. The 
planner can set the hours required for repair at each echelon. If an adequate number of 
mechanics by type are provided in the appropriate maintenance units at the appropriate 
echelons, then the systems will be repaired according to the time requirements and 
returned to the owning unit (Savinovich, 2013). 
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Figure 34.  Planning Factors Maintenance Tab (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
In Figure 35, PAE provides medical service awareness by importing data from the 
Fort Sam Houston U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) that distributes casualties 
between Levels 1 to 6 medical treatment facilities according to posture (Curry, 2013). If 
appropriate medical beds are available in the units, the casualties will be treated and 
returned to their units. If not enough beds are available, the casualties are sent to the next 
highest echelon of medical care (PAE Manual, 2013). 
 
Figure 35.  Planning Factors—Medical Treatment Factors (from PAE Manual, 
2013) 
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Another collaborative tool in PAE as seen in Figure 36 is called the transportation 
window. As noted in the PAE Manual (2013), planners are provided with the current 
status of all transportation assets as determined by the time selected on the timeline and 
any transportation assets scheduled for use. The transportation window enables planners 
to forecast vehicle usage up to two hours before the time selected and up to four hours 
after the time selected (PAE Manual, 2013).  
 
Figure 36.  Truck Availability (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
Another behavioral model within PAE provides planners with the ability to 
predict when a unit needs to be refueled (Curry, 2013). The system determines the fuel 
pacing item (that platform that will run out of fuel first based on consumption vs. fuel 
tank capacity) (PAE Manual, 2013). As seen in Figure 37, when that asset reaches a 
planner's defined threshold (default is 30% remaining), the entire unit is refueled. The 
system sends a message to its refueling unit (predictively) and that unit sends out the 
necessary number of trucks (Savinovich, 2013). Savinovich (2013) continues to explain if 
either fuel storage or transport is not available, the system alerts the planner.  
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Figure 37.  Rest and Refuel Halt Options (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
8. Wargaming  
One of the most dynamic features that PAE provides is automated and manually 
influenced play during wargaming as seen in Figure 38. Fundamentally, PAE provides 
planners with all the science of war and allows the planners to determine the success or 
failure of a COA (PAE Manual, 2013). Wargaming simulation assists the planner in 
creating multiple COA based on aforementioned behavioral and analytical models and 
then wargames them (Savinovich, 2013). At the end of the wargames, PAE will compare 
the wargames to determine which COA is stronger based on a series of criteria 
(mentioned above), which the user can modify, but again, it is the user that must 
determine the success or failure of a COA. 
 
Figure 38.  Auto Wargame Dialog Box (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
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D. HOW WILL THE PAE ALLOW COLLABORATION? 
PAE provides a robust platform of collaborative tools. As mentioned previously, 
PAE enables real-time information to any planner regardless of geographical location. 
Unique capabilities that PAE brings to an OPT and staff that will help frame a complex 
environment are described as follows.  
1. Smart Routes  
As seen in Figure 39, PAE enables planners to create smart routes, major supply 
routes (MSR) and alternate supply routes (ASR) with the start point (SP), check points 
(CP), and release points (RP) attached to them (PAE Manual, 2013). Planners simply 
place each CP on the map. PAE prompts the planner to associate it with the MSR and 
ASR if desired (Savinovich, 2013). These smart points allow the user to reuse the route 
segments and allow the user to navigate across the area of operations (AO) quickly (PAE 
Manual, 2013). 
 
Figure 39.  Unit Movement Window (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
During unit movements, the planner can determine the amount of time the unit 
will occupy road space, the passing time, clear times, length of the column, serial and 
march unit (Savinovich, 2013). As Figure 40 illustrates appropriate movement order, strip 
maps, convoy clearance requests (movement bid), and Excel spreadsheets are the output 
 65 
files provided by this window. Although designed for complete units, it can also be 
utilized for subunits or convoy operations. 
 
Figure 40.  Movement Order (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
Additionally, because of the high frequency of SIGACTS that occur along supply 
routes, an incident avoidance capability was created based on past SIGACTS to predict 
where and when to avoid certain route segments (Savinovich, 2013). Using the SIGACTS 
database, the convoy avoidance feature will allow the planners to see significant activities 
along the designated route. These activities can be filtered by time and day or date ,and 
choose the best time to travel the route, or have the software reroute the convoy to avoid 




Figure 41.  Smart Route Waypoint (from PAE Manual, 2013) 
2. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure  
The PAE diplomatic, information, military, and economic (PMESII) interface 
details the features and concepts of the diplomatic, informational, military and/or 
economic (DIME)/PMESII functionality within the PAE (PAE Manual, 2013). PAE 
allows planners to load nodes and links from a local database to a mission. Furthermore, 
planners are able to import nodes and links from an external database and then perform 
centrality analysis for nodes and links as seen in Figure 42 (PAE Manual, 2013). This 
study provides planners a better awareness of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd orders of effects on either 
operations or a civilian populace (Savinovich, 2013).  
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Figure 42.  DIME/PMESII (from Savinovich, 2013) 
3. Significant Actions (SIGACTS) Within PAE 
In PAE, SIGACTS functionality provides users with the tools to view significant 
actions or lists of events for the region within a specified duration of time and location 
(Savinovich, 2013). The SIGACTS feature in PAE allows the user to view significant 
actions with user-defined filters and to correlate these actions to various calendars to help 
model predictions for future actions within an event type (PAE Manual, 2013).  
For PAE, SIGACTS downloads all Combined Information Data Network 
Exchange (CIDNE) SIGACTS events from the CIDNE web service and stores them 
locally. As seen in Figure 43, PAE then displays these events visually on a map and tabs 
located in the Execution Matrix (PAE Manual, 2013). PAE can then predict what events 
might take place in the future based on past relevant data pertaining to a specific event 
and period (Savinovich, 2013). 
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Figure 43.  SIGACTS (from Savinovich, 2013)  
4. Briefings, Orders Development, and Transition 
Planning application has two methods for presenting, PowerPoint briefings and 
report features. Both methods can assist planners with writing an operations plan, or 
order and preparing for confirmation briefs (Savinovich, 2013). The briefings are done 
through the presentation tab and the logistics presentation tab under reports. Additionally, 
under reports, the software auto generates an OPLAN/operations order (OPORD), 
fragmentary order (FRAGO), warning order (WARNORD), task organization (TaskOrg), 
sync matrix, and annexes A, B, C, I, unknown and neutral, unit RCP, and AA as seen in 
Figure 44 (PAE Manual, 2013). The various reports can be accessed by clicking on 
Planning Tools/Reports/and then select the report desired. Microsoft Office must be 
installed to use the PAE reporting features (Savinovich, 2013). 
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Figure 44.  OPLAN (from Savinovich, 2013) 
5. Summary 
PAE provides a robust platform that leverages current C2 systems. PAE enables 
planners to establish a real-time collaborative environment, which continues to increase 
the post-adoption expectation or the usefulness of PAE, as seen when planners are able to 
provide better fidelity regardless of experience, and a forum for planners to expand 
awareness and skills. By using the aforementioned GUIs, the planner will be able to focus 
efforts toward the art of war that will provide the combatant commander a higher quality 
of information, and thus, increase the satisfaction of PAE as a viable innovation. PAE 
provides some concern that influence PAE’s adoption. First, PAE’s GUIs appear along 
the top of the application and are incorporated in the main JTCW toolbar, which 
increases the complexity of PAE. As seen in Figure 45, each of these concerns is an 
external variable that negatively affects the PU and PEOU of PAE and decreases the BI 
to adopt PAE. Next, using KVA analysis, this thesis examines if PAE provides benefits 




Figure 45.  Negative Influence External Variables on BI using TAM 
(from Davis, 1989) 
E. HOW MUCH VALUE DOES PAE ADD TO R2P2? 
The KVA methodology addresses the longstanding need of commanders and 
leaders to be able to measure the value of the knowledge that exists within employees, 
processes, and IT (Housel & Bell, 2001). A ROK ratio is produced by the KVA analysis, 
which shows the estimated value added by process assets to the final process output. 
The focus of this KVA analysis is to examine the current (As-Is) Marine Corps 
R2P2) and through the use of business process reengineering (BPR) to identify areas to 
increase efficiencies within R2P2. As defined by O’Neill and Sohal (1999), BPR involves 
the fundamental analysis in current processes, structure, and information systems that 
will identify areas that can be radically improved or modified (e.g., time, cost, quality, 
and customer service).  
The R2P2 planning process is the same as the MCPP with some modifications 
due to time constraints (MCWP 5-1, 2010). The problem framing step is essentially the 
same while COA development is limited to three COAs. The COA wargame is informal 
with two of the three COAs compared. Then, the confirmation brief constitutes the order, 
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and rehearsals are the primary means for subordinates to show understanding of what is 
needed in mission execution. 
1. As-Is Process 
R2P2 enables a unit (such as an MEU) to receive, analyze, plan, and coordinate a 
mission within six hours of notification. The standard is to commence the mission within 
six hours of tasking. Mission commencement does not necessarily mean actions on the 
objective, but simply taking step towards (launching R&S) achieving mission 
accomplishment. To achieve this MEU, the commander will establish three types of 
planning cells: crisis action team (CAT), battle staff, and mission planning cell (MPC) 
and will provide each planning cell their own planning spaces. The staffs know the roles 
and functions in each of the planning cells, which will allow simultaneous planning 
during R2P2. 
Information flow must be a single point of contact, which will establish and 
control the flow of information. Additionally, developing execution checklists and smart-
packs, and maintaining records of mission planning and execution all aid in effective 
information flow. As illustrated in Figure 46, upon receipt/acknowledgement of a 
WARNORD or an OPORD, the commander or designated individual establishes the 
CAT. The CAT builds awareness for the commander, which also allows the battle staff to 
be assembled and ready to receive the transfer of information from the CAT. Once the 
battle staff has received the information from the CAT, the information is analyzed and 
developed into a problem statement. Both the CAT and battle staff will then display all 
the information for the commander to approve. The assumption is that the commander 
will approve 90% and disapprove 10% of all problem statements.  
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Figure 46.  Savvion Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) As-Is Model 
Once the problem statement has been approved, a WARNORD is sent out for all 
other units to begin planning. At this point, the battle staff will develop three (COAs. 
Upon completion of all three COAs, the battle staff will again seek the commander’s 
approval. During this phase, an assumption has been made that the commander will again 
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approve 90% and disapprove/modify 10% of all COAs. Once the COAs have been 
approved, the commander will activate the ,MPC), which will then wargame all three 
COAs and determine which COA will provide the best outcome for the mission/task. At 
this point, the MPC will provide a matrix that will compare all COAs and pursue the 
commander’s approval. The same assumption has been made that the commander will 
again approve 90% and disapprove/modify 10% of a COA.  
Once the commander has approved a COA, the battle staff will start orders 
development. During this phase, the battle staff will provide the writing document known 
as the OPORD. Once it is complete, the battle staff will request commander approval. 
During this phase, an assumption has been made that the commander will approve 80% 
and disapprove/modify 20% of the approved OPORDs. Once approved, the battle staff 
will provide a confirmation brief that will allow other units to walk through their 
OPORDs. Once the confirmation brief is complete, the transition phase begins. In the 
transition phase, the Amphibious Task Force will initiate rehearsals. 
a. Personnel Assignment 
 Amphibious Task Force:   (150 personnel @ $29/hour each)  
 MEU staff    (100 personnel @ $35/hour each) 
 Battle staff     (12 personnel @ $33/hour each) 
 CAT     (12 personnel @ $33/hour each) 
 MPC     (8 personnel @ $21/hour each) 
Note: The Amphibious Task Force is not calculated for either utilization or cost. 
Furthermore, Amphibious Task Force has 2 hours of rehearsals, which are still 
accounted for in the overall six-hour requirement. 
b. R2P2 Process Flow within Savvion 
Receipt of WARNORD     100% Complete 
Problem Framing:      100% Complete 
 CAT/battle staff develop awareness/problem (50 min) 
 Statement 
 Commander approves problem statement  10% (No) 
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        90% (Yes) 
COA development      100% Complete 
 Battle staff develops three COAs   (20 min) 
 Commander approves all three COAs  10% (No) 
        90% (Yes) 
Course of action war game and comparison/decision 100% Complete 
 Mission planning cell war games all three COAs (20 min) 
 Commander approves one COA   10% (No) 
        90% (Yes) 
Order development      100% Complete 
 Battle staff develops operational order  (1 hour 30 min) 
 Commander approves problem statement  20% (No) 
        80% (Yes) 
 Battle staff executes confirmation briefs  (1 hours) 
Transition       100% Complete 
 Amphibious Task Force rehearsal   (2 hours) 
c. Assumptions for Simulation 
 All software cost are already installed and accounted in cost 
 All missions received are unique 
 All staffs and planning cells understanding of the MCPP. 
 All SOP are established and understood 
 All C2 systems are functional and connected 
 All planning groups have and understand responsibility and workspace 
location 
 Each planning group will not have the same planners/personnel 
 R2P2 will produce 40 different products to aid the Commander’s decision 
cycle 
 Confirmation Brief replaces a Doctrinal Operations Order 
 One work day equals 12 hours 
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 One week equals 84 hours 
 One month equals 336 hours 
 A six month deployment equals 2,016 hours 
 Each deployment consists of 48 instances with 18 hours between each 
instance 
 Each phase will have a normal distribution of 1 minute per staff function 
and phase transition 
Table 1 shows the As-Is simulation results. After running 48 instances at a cost of 
$101,831.40 (excluding the Amphibious Task Force) with no waiting time and an overall 
time of 307 hours, the As-Is model performed at an average of six hours and 41 minutes. 





Table 1.   Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Result of As-Is Model 
 
KVA - No REVENUE
IT as a Minor Additive
 Hours Day 12
Actions/Day 0.42
Action/hour 0.035
Revenue per action 12,000.00$                 Reduction 1.00%



















 Total Input 
per Day 
 Cost per 
day 
NUM DEN ROK Cost to 
Benefit Ratio
Battle Staff Action 7 18 0.2359 4 50% 10.50 9.91 0.0021 0.0490% 0.0020 $132.00 947.40$         $0.26 3662% 0.03%
Restart COA Development 4 1 0.0246 4 50% 6.00 0.59 0.2143 0.5282% 0.0211 $132.00 56.56$           $2.79 20% 4.93%
Warning Order 3 1 0.1690 4 50% 4.50 3.04 0.0387 0.6543% 0.0262 $132.00 290.89$         $3.45 84% 1.19%
Approved COA 2 1 0.2254 3 50% 3.00 2.03 0.1406 3.1690% 0.0951 $99.00 193.92$         $9.41 21% 4.85%
Battle Staff Order Development 7 20 0.2535 3 50% 10.50 7.99 0.0032 0.0802% 0.0024 $99.00 763.58$         $0.24 3206% 0.03%
Confirmation Brief_Issue Order 1 3 0.2254 3 50% 1.50 1.01 0.0834 1.8799% 0.0564 $99.00 96.96$           $5.58 17% 5.76%
Restart Order Development 4 1 0.0282 3 50% 6.00 0.51 0.3750 1.0563% 0.0317 $99.00 48.48$           $3.14 15% 6.47%
Battle Staff 6 15 0.0951 8 50% 9.00 6.85 0.0006 0.0056% 0.0004 $132.00 654.49$         $0.06 11117% 0.01%
Crisis Action Team 6 14 0.0951 8 50% 9.00 6.85 0.0155 0.1473% 0.0118 $132.00 654.49$         $1.56 421% 0.24%
Restart Problem Framing 2 1 0.0106 8 50% 3.00 0.25 0.0024 0.0025% 0.0002 $132.00 24.24$           $0.03 920% 0.11%
COAs 1 2 3 3 1 0.1690 5 50% 4.50 3.80 0.0002 0.0031% 0.0002 $42.00 363.61$         $0.01 56739% 0.00%
Go Back to COA Development 4 1 0.0845 2 50% 6.00 1.01 0.0009 0.0076% 0.0002 $80.00 96.96$           $0.01 7943% 0.01%
Mission Planning Cell  WG COAs 7 23 0.8451 1 50% 10.50 8.87 0.0023 0.1960% 0.0020 $130.00 848.42$         $0.25 3330% 0.03%
Sum 56 100 N/A 56 N/A 84.00 53 N/A N/A 0.2 1,440.0 5,040.00$       $26.79 188% 0.53%
Correlation 89%        
Ref. Method Frameworks cost per session
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2. To-Be Process 
After completion of the analysis of the “As-Is,” it was determined that the total 
cost for the R2P2 process was greater than $101K (minus the Amphibious Task Force 
rehearsal cost). The first goal was to find an approach to reduce total cost by 25% or 
$25,457.85, while reducing the overall R2P2 process time from six hours to five hours. In 
addition, the team was directed to increase both battle staffs by 200%, as well as the 
utilization of the CAT. To meet these goals, the following two steps occurred, as 
illustrated in Figure 47. 
 First step, the team removed half of the personnel from the CAT, and both 
battle staffs, which resulted in a personnel level of (12) CAT, and (six) in 
both battle staffs. By reducing the personnel, the overall savings for R2P2 
was $62,675.10, which equals a 39% reduction in cost. Additionally, the 
team was able to meet the goal of increasing personnel utilization by 
200% through a reduction in personnel. The To-Be analysis resulted in an 
increase from 0.147% to 0.799%, which is a 0.65% increase for the CAT. 
Concurrently, battle staff 1 increased from 0.049% to 0.729%, which 
resulted in a 0.68% increase. Finally, battle staff 2 increased from 0.080% 
to 11.80% to yield a significant 11.72% increase. 
 Second step, the team automated the R2P2 process through the use of 
PAE. PAE was implemented in first four swim lanes (e.g., problem 
framing is a swim lane) at the start of each process, which resulted in a 
reduction in time from six hours to four hours and 44 minutes that resulted 
in a savings of one hour and 16 minutes. By injecting PAE at the start of 
each process, planning team and staffs are able to reduce staff actions on 
the science of planning and focus more on the art of planning. Thus, the 
staff leveraged PAE’s ability to complete complex and mundane actions 
that traditionally erode time during R2P2 planning. This reduction in the 
science of planning allows an intuitive increase in time during the art or 
planning, and ultimately leads to a better thought out problem set with a 
higher quality return on performance on objectives. 
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Figure 47.  Savvion Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2) To-Be Model 
Table 2 shows To-Be simulation results. After running 48 instances at a cost of 
$62,675.10 (excluding the Amphibious Task Force cost) with no waiting time and an 
overall time of 227.26 hours, the To-Be model performed at an average of four hours and 
44 minutes. Furthermore, the personnel were utilized an average of 0.026% and no 




Table 2.   Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Result of To-Be Model 
 
KVA - No REVENUE
IT as a Minor Additive
 Hours Day 12
Actions/Day 0.42
Action/hour 0.035
Revenue per action 12,000.00$                 Reduction 1.00%


















 Total Input 
per Day 
 Cost per 
day 
NUM DEN




Battle Staff 7 6 0.1383 5 50% 10.50 7.26 0.0136 0.3903% 0.00938 $132.00 5,040.00$       $1.24 4070% 0.02%
Crisis Action Team 4 8 0.2833 5 50% 6.00 8.50 0.0278 0.7994% 0.03935 $132.00 5,898.80$       $5.19 1136% 0.09%
Restart Problem Framing 1 1 0.5833 1 50% 1.50 0.88 0.1944 1.6458% 0.11343 $132.00 607.23$         $14.97 41% 2.47%
Planning Application Extension 10 13 0.1167 1 50% 15.00 1.75 0.0023 0.3292% 0.00027 $99.00 1,214.46$       $0.03 45965% 0.00%
Battle Staff Action 7 5 0.2583 3 50% 10.50 8.14 0.0136 0.7288% 0.01054 $99.00 5,647.23$       $1.04 5413% 0.02%
Restart COA Development 1 1 0.0058 1 50% 1.50 0.01 0.0019 0.0165% 0.00001 $99.00 6.07$             $0.00 5408% 0.02%
Warning Order 1 1 0.1192 1 50% 1.50 0.18 0.0025 0.3362% 0.00030 $99.00 124.05$         $0.03 4235% 0.02%
Planning Application Extension 2 10 10 0.1250 1 50% 15.00 1.88 0.0022 0.3527% 0.00027 $132.00 1,301.20$       $0.04 35961% 0.00%
COAs 1 2 3 6 8 0.1667 1 50% 9.00 1.50 0.0031 0.4702% 0.00051 $132.00 1,040.96$       $0.07 15331% 0.01%
Go Back to COA Development 2 1 0.0100 1 50% 3.00 0.03 0.0017 0.0282% 0.00002 $132.00 20.82$           $0.00 9463% 0.01%
Mission Planning Cell  WG COAs 3 8 7.5833 1 50% 4.50 34.13 0.1404 21.3950% 1.06494 $42.00 23,681.93$     $44.73 529% 0.19%
Planning Application Extension3 10 15 0.1167 1 50% 15.00 1.75 0.0022 0.3292% 0.00025 $80.00 1,214.46$       $0.02 60227% 0.00%
Approved COA 3 1 0.0583 2 50% 4.50 0.53 0.0024 0.1646% 0.00028 $130.00 364.34$         $0.04 9883% 0.01%
Planning Application Extension4 10 10 0.1167 1 50% 15.00 1.75 0.0023 0.3292% 0.00027 $130.00 1,214.46$       $0.04 34317% 0.00%
Restart Order Development 1 1 0.0042 1 50% 1.50 0.01 0.0021 0.0118% 0.00001 $130.00 4.34$             $0.00 3844% 0.03%
Battle Staff Order Development 7 8 4.1833 1 50% 10.50 43.93 0.0837 11.8025% 0.35001 $130.00 30,482.89$     $45.50 670% 0.15%
Confirmation Brief_Issue Order 1 3 2.0000 1 50% 1.50 3.00 0.0417 5.6426% 0.08333 $130.00 2,081.93$       $10.83 192% 0.52%
Sum 55 100 N/A 13 N/A 82.50 89 N/A N/A 1.5 1,366.0 61,537.45$     $101.29 608% 0.16%
Correlation 88%
Ref. Method Frameworks cost per session
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3. Conclusion 
By reducing personnel and implementing PAE into the R2P2 planning process, 
the results found were quite insightful. This achievement offers further confirmation that 
PAE is a valid software innovation and must be used in today’s complex environment. As 
illustrated in Table 3, the goals were achieved when PAE was implemented into the R2P2 
process. Specifically, the team analyzed the As-Is model, using KVA, that identified a 
significant amount of slack that contributed to low utilization percentage. Conversely, 
adding PAE and reducing personnel across the board achieved a reduction in overall cost, 





Table 3.   As-Is versus To-Be R2P2 Model 
 
As-Is Processes









Battle Staff Action 1 3662% 0.049% Battle Staff Action 1 5413% 0.729% 1. Total Cost Reduction of 25% ($25,457.85) $39,156.30
Restart COA Development 20% Restart COA Development 5408%
Warning Order 84% Warning Order 4235%
Planning Application Extension 2 35961% 2.Ruduce the As-Is time by 1 hour (5 hours) 1:41
Approved COA 21% Approved COA 9883%
Planning Application Extension4 34317% 3. Increase utilization of CAT/Battle Staffs by 200%
Restart Order Development 15% Restart Order Development 3844% CAT (0.29%) 0.65%
Battle Staff 2 Order Development 3206% 0.080% Battle Staff Order 2 Development 670% 11.803% Battle Staff 1 (0.10%) 0.68%
Confirmation Brief_Issue Order 17% Confirmation Brief_Issue Order 192% Battle Staff 2 ( 0.16%) 11.72%
Battle Staff 11117% 0.006% Battle Staff 1 4070% 0.390%
Crisis Action Team 421% 0.147% Crisis Action Team 1136% 0.799%
Restart Problem Framing 920% Restart Problem Framing 41%
Planning Application Extension 45965%
COAs 1 2 3 56739% COAs 1 2 3 15331%
Go Back to COA Development 7943% Go Back to COA Development 9463%
Mission Planning Cell  WG COAs 3330% Mission Planning Cell  WG COAs 529%
Planning Application Extension3 60227%
Sum 188% N/A Sum 608% N/A
As-Is             
Cost
To-Be                 
Cost
$101,831.40 $62,675.10
As-Is             
Time









Innovations in software can provide organizations a platform to establish a 
collaborative environment that leverages new technologies. The Marine Corps must look 
at existing innovations that can link current systems to decision makers. As today’s 
technology has advanced, the Marine Corps’ duty is to capture innovations that will 
provide a better collaborative environment. This collaborative environment, and 
specifically C2 systems, must facilitate information retrieval at all levels while 
maintaining the authoritative integrity.  
This thesis established a starting point that will provide information on 
collaborative software currently employed within a MAGTF. Additionally, this thesis 
examined how the PAE can efficiently improve information sharing during an OPT 
session. Having this context of how real time information empowers the commander, 
staffs, and planners will deliver a quality of information for increased operational 
awareness. Furthermore, through the lens of the TAM, the element that helps distinguish 
the technology adoption problem within the Marine Corps was identified. 
B. FINDINGS 
Thesis finding indicates that the PAE—a layer seven software extension—can be 
highly effective if properly implemented and staffs and planners are trained. PAE 
provides many positive attributes. First, PAE has a powerful platform for wargaming 
through the use of AI. The AI within PAE is a complicated computation of algorithms 
and behavioral models that enable multiple COAs to be analyzed and simulated against 
enemy and friendly RCP, which is significant in enhancing the user’s PU and post-
adoption expectations as seen in the TAM.  
Second, PAE empowers commanders to simulate each COA and provide 
immediate feedback with highly responsive staff action, which allows staff and planners 
to make real time changes regardless of geographic location. As seen, this immediate 
feedback increases the knowledge of PAE that increases the perception of usefulness as 
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defined by Davis (1989). Finally, PAE has shown many benefits during a KVA 
simulation. By using R2P2 as a simple process for the KVA simulation, PAE enabled a 
50% reduction in staffing of a standard MEU, and a cost reduction per planning processes 
of 39% was achieved. Additionally, PAE enables the standard six hours R2P2 process to 
decrease to four hours and 44 minutes, which saved one 1 hour and 16 minutes. These 
results are significant as seen in TAM; the adoption of technology is closely tied to the 
pre-conceived notions about the costs or benefits. As seen after using PAE, the post-
adoption expectations is very high. PAE provides a combatant commander cost savings 
while reducing planning time that will positively affect its adoption.  
Conversely, PAE does have some negative attributes that have affected its overall 
adoption. First, PAE is not widely known, as seen with only 70 Marines having been 
trained since 2009, which has greatly affected PAE’s PU and EOU. Having minimal 
knowledge has led to missed opportunities for other values, such as persuasion, decision, 
implementation, and confirmation. Second, although the TAM is used, the perceived ease 
is affected by PAE’s user interface, which is complex and not intuitive if not formally 
trained on it. Awareness and user interface are external variables that have greatly 
affected PAE’s adoption rate.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Thesis recommendations are that PAE becomes software of record to provide 
continuity in the execution of MCPP regardless of geographic location. MAGTF MSTP 
should incorporate PAE in future MAGTF training, both integrated into the current 
curriculum and through distance learning. Furthermore, an updated PAE GUI is 
necessary that will provide an intuitive experience and influence the PEOU for the user.  
D. FURTHER RESEARCH  
This thesis is a starting point to begin a conversation about current software 
platforms underutilized within the Marine Corps. This thesis revealed three major areas 
for research in the author’s opinion. First, more research is needed regarding current 
software to leverage existing C2 systems, specifically in the application layer of the OSI 
model. This research could potentially enhance the Marine Corps’ warfighting 
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capabilities and operational reach of the combatant commander in the current fiscal 
environment. Second, the Marine Corps should complete an examination of C2 platforms 
that degrade existing C2 systems while negatively affecting warfighting capabilities. This 
analysis will provide context in cost reduction for future C2 systems. Third, more 
research is needed using systems analysis to identify gaps within the Marine Corps’ 
current C2 network. This analysis will provide a foundation for current and future 
software platform design and security requirements. Last, conduct an in-depth study on 
technology adoption within the Marine Corps to frame institutional norms that affect 
technology design, implementation, and usage.  
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